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METHODS OF ATTACKING RECEIVERSHIPS
THE EQUITY receivership inaugurated as an extraordinary remedy for cor-
porations unable to pay their debts as they mature has long been criticized
as an effective vehicle for the machinations of dominant banker-management
groups.' Assisted by such carefully secured aids as a friendly court, a few
obliging creditors, and puppet protective committees, these groups have suc-
ceeded in maneuvering the most complicated corporate structures through
the intricacies of the modern reorganization, often with little or no concern for
the interests of investors at large. Nor have the receivership courts exhibited
any marked inclination to insist upon the protection of minority rights, for the
very complexity of the plans commonly presented for review has militated
against any thoroughgoing analysis of the issues at stake. Pressed by the
exigencies of judicial business and conscious of the practical necessity of
consummating some sort of reorganization, the lower courts, at least, have
tended to stamp with their approval any plan which could obtain the requi-
site number of consents and which promised an end to tedious litigation.2
1. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON PROTECTIVE AND
REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1936-1937) Part I, Section II and pp. 868-883; LOWEN-
THAL, THE INVESTOR PAYS (1933); Taft, Recent Criticism of The Federal Judiciary,
A.B.A. REP. (1895) 237, 263.
2. See Foster, Conflicting Ideals for Reorganication, (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923.
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Because of this emphasis on practical considerations and because of the
consequent almost universal abhorrence of the so-called "strike" or "nuisance"
suit, it is not surprising that the complaints of isolated objectors have some-
times been frigidly received. 3 In spite of occasional outbursts by the Supreme
Court against the supposedly more flagrant "collusive" receiverships, the
rights of the dissenting creditor, stockholder or, in the rare case, corpora-
tion have nowhere been clearly defined. Moreover, certain procedural hazards
have been interposed, which vary according to the method of attack em-
ployed, but which are well calculated to hinder the adequate enforcement of
these rights.
In planning his course of attack, an interested party contesting the receiver-
ship is confronted with two broad alternatives. He may attack the proceed-
ing in toto, contending either that it is a complete nullity or at least that it
is void in its effect upon himself, or he may object to specific orders within
the scope of the receivership. It will be the task of this Comment to set
forth the various methods by which these two general objectives may be
attained and to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages presented by each
approach from the point of view, not only of the attacker, but of the cor-
poration and of those who have acted in good faith with the dominant group.
Preliminary to any discussion of the methods by which a receivership may
be wholly set aside, it is important first to note that the way is straight in
those cases where it is the defendant corporation which is attacking the
proceeding. Although the appointment of a receiver is generally considered
an interlocutory order,4 it is appealable in most jurisdictions.5 The require-
ment in the federal statute that the order to be appealed from must be "upon
a hearing" causes no difficulty, since it has been held not to prevent an
appeal from an ex parte orderr0 except where the latter sets up merely a tem-
porary receivership and provides for an early hearing as to its permanency.7
But if the case is close, the defendant may well have difficulty in getting the
order reversed, since the appointment of a receiver is said to be a matter
within the discretion of the lower court.8 Yet the remedy is quite clear.
3. E.g., cases cited in notes 15, 19, 40 infra.
4. Muellhaupt v. Strowbridge Estate Co., 136 Ore. 99. 298 Pac. 186 (1931);
Lloyds of Texas v. Bobbitt, 55 S. XV. (2d) 803 (Tex. 1932); see I CLAn, LAV AN.D
PACTICE OF REcEivmEs (2d ed. 1929) § 52. But cf. Forest City Inv. Co. v. Haas,
110 Ohio St. 188, 143 N. E. 549 (1924).
5. E.g.. 31 STAT. 660 (1900), 28 U.S.C. §227 (1934); CAL- ConE Civ. Pr.oc.
(Deering, 1937) §963-2; IND. ST.T. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §3-2603; Reynolds & Co.
v. Gordon, 234 Mich. 189, 207 N. V. 811 (1926); Cunliffe v. Consumers Ass'n of
America, 280 Pa. 263, 124 At!. 501 (1924). Interlocutory orders are generally appeal-
able in New York. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT §§ 609, 611.
6. Joseph Dry Goods Co. v. Hecht, 120 Fed. 760 (C. C.A. 5th, 1903); Marion
Mortgage Co. v. Edmunds, 64 F. (2d) 248 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
7. See id., at 250.
8. See 1 CLAiu, LAW AND PRACTICE OF RECEIVERS (2d ed. 1929) § 53. The
Supreme Court of Missouri, among others, has had difficulty in interpreting this con-
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The appeal is of right, so that no matter how biased or unreasonable the
lower court may be, the defendant can attack the receivership from the
start.9 Generally upon the filing of a bond, a stay or supersedeas may be
had, either that the receiver may be restrained from further action10 or even
that he be required to hand back the property pending the appeal.1 1 The
only procedural hazard encountered by the original defendant is undue delay
in making his attack,'2 for the courts have displayed small sympathy for
objections raised for the first time after some months, when the probable
outcome of the receivership had been determined to be unfavorable. 3
In the typical consent receivership, however, it is not the defendant cor-
poration which is making the attack but rather groups of creditors or stock-
holders or both, and when one of these groups attempts to set the receiver-
ship aside in its entirety the procedural difficulties encountered are manifold.
In view of the ease with which the defendant may obtain a review of the
appointment of the receiver, it is apparent that the objecting creditor or
stockholder could do no better than be substituted in that position. The
obvious course to this end would be to intervene and be made co-defendant,
but in the federal courts at the present time Equity Rule 37 requires that
intervention be "in subordination to, and in recognition of, the propriety of
the main proceeding."' 14 The prospective intervener is thus barred from the
cept. Compare Commonwealth Finance Corp. v. Missouri Motor Bus Co., 233 S.W.
167, 168 (Mo. 1921) ("palpable abuse of discretion" necessary for reversal), with
Bushman v. Bushman, 311 Mo. 551, 560, 279 S.W. 122, 125 (1925) (appointment
"should not be upheld unless . . . it appears that the court's action was for the
best interests of the parties").
9. In re McKenzie, 180 U. S. 536 (1901). For the story of this case and of a
dramatic example of abuse by a lower court of the receivership process, see Campbell,
Brigandage by J.dicial Process; an Incident in Alaskan Jvdicial History (1923) 17
ILL. L. REv. 345.
10. Wolbrette v. New Orleans Drug Co., 149 La. 434, 89 So. 406 (1921); State
ex rel. Leake v. Harris, 334 Mo. 713, 67 S. W. (2d) 981 (1934).
11. State Founders, Inc. v. Oliver, 165 Md. 360, 169 Atl. 59 (1933) ; see Tornanses
v. Melsing, 106 Fed. 775, 788 (C. C. A. 9th, 1901), approved, In re McKenzie, 180 U. S.
536, 550 (1901).
12. Haight & Freese Co. v. Weiss, 156 Fed. 328 (C. C. A. 1st, 1907), cert. denied,
207 U. S. 594 (1907); Root v. Mills, 168 Fed. 688 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909). Care should
also be taken to appeal at the proper time and from the proper order, although the
courts tend to be liberal in this respect. Pacific Northwest Packing Co. v. Allen,
109 Fed. 515 (C. C.A. 9th, 1901); Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Ellis Estate Co.,
216 Cal. 280, 13 P. (2d) 929 (1932). Where a statute provides for an immediate
appeal, the order of appointment is not appealable from the final decree. Maitia v.
Allied Land & Live Stock Co., 49 Nev. 451, 248 Pac. 893 (1926).
13. King v. Barr, 262 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 484
(1920); New York Trust Co. v. Watts-Ritter & Co., 57 F. (2d) 1012 (C. C. A. 4th,
1932).
14. 198 Fed. xxix (1912), 28 U. S. C. A. § 723 (1928) ; HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL
EQurn RuNEs (8th ed. 1933) 232.
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very thing he is seeking to do. Clearly, if the petition in intervention reveals
a purpose to attack the proceedings, by appeal from the order of appointment
or otherwise, the objector has virtually no chanceYin Furthermore, the right
to intervene for any purpose whatsoever is often discretionary with the trial
court, and no appeal may thus be taken from an order denying intervention l
There is, however, an exception to this latter rule. If intervention is denied
where the intervener possesses a meritorious claim and has no other way
of asserting it, an appeal may be taken as of right 1 7 Moreover, in a sur-
prising number of cases appeals have been heard for less cogent reasons
although these have almost uniformly been in vain.18
In any case, the attacking intervener must overcome deepseated judicial
disapproval, for even before the adoption of Rule 37 it was often held that
where the defendant corporation had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court, interveners were helpless to question it,10 unless there was a glaring
lack of federal jurisdiction.2 0 Even fraud and collusion in the receiver's
appointment were no basis for intervention as defendant. 2 More recently
there have been similar decisions denying relief to interveners without even
mentioning Rule 37.22 The apparent effect of these decisions is to foreclose
all possibility of attack through intervention except in those cases where
the intervener might resort to the accepted principles of collateral attack. =
15. Mueller v. Adler, 292 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 721
(1924); In re Veach, 4 F. (2d) 334 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); cf. United States v. Cali-
fornia Coop. Canneries, 279 U. S. 553, 556 (1929).
16. Rheinberger v. Security Life Ins. Co. of America, 72 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A.
7th, 1934) ; Stallings v. Conn, 74 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
17. United States v. Philips, 107 Fed. 824 (C. CA. 8th, 1901); Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. United States & Medcan Trust Co., 221 Fed. 545 (C.C.A. 8th,
1915); Richfield Oil Co. v. Western Machinery Co., 279 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 9th, 1922),
cert. denied, 260 U. S. 723 (1922). But cf. Moore and Levi, Federal Interm'ntion I.
The Right to Intervene and Reorganization (1936) 45 YAaE L. J. 565, 595 et Seq.
18. Pillinger v. Beaty, 265 Fed. 551 (C. C.A. 4th, 1920); Cole v. Seaman, 266
Fed. 846 (C. C.A. 8th, 1920) ; Whittaker v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 43 F. (2d) 485 (C. CA.
8th, 1930).
19. Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U.S. 129 (1894); Citizens' Bank &
Trust Co. v. Union Mining & Gold Co., 106 Fed. 97 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1900); McGraw
v. Mott, 179 Fed. 646 (C. CA. 4th, 1910).
20. See International Trust Co. v. T. B. Tovmsend Brick & Contracting Co., 95
Fed. 850, 854 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899); Briggs v. Traders' Co., 145 Fed. 254, 257 (C. C.
N. D. W. Va. 1906).
21. Land Title & Trust Co. v. Asphalt Co. of America, 114 Fed. 484 (C. C. N. J.
1902).
22. Cole v. Seaman, 266 Fed. 846 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) ; f. Scattergood v. American
Pipe & Const. Co., 249 Fed. 23 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918), cert. granted, 247 U. S. 516 (1918),
dismissed, 251 U. S. 564 (1919); American S. S. Co. v. Wickvwire Spencer Steel Co.,
42 F. (2d) 886 (XW. D. N. Y. 1930).
23. See King v. Barr, 262 Fed. 56, 59 (C. C.A. 9th, 1920), ccri. deried, 253 U. S.
484 (1920).
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Actually, however, there have been very occasional decisions which offer
some hope for the objector.
In 1922 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a
creditor with a meritorious claim and no other remedy had an absolute
right to intervene at any time in the receivership proceedings and could
appeal from its denial. 24 The holding was perfectly conventional,20 but in
reversing the denial of the petition to intervene the court completely ignored
the fact that the relief sought included a dismissal of the original bill and
the vacation of the order appointing the receiver. The case of course did
not decide that the attack would be successful, but at least it assured the
objector intervention and a hearing. Still more remarkable is the recent
case of Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle West Utilities Co.,26 which involved
an appeal by a stockholder, previously permitted to intervene, from the denial
of a prayer that the original bill be dismissed or that the order of appoint-
ment be vacated and a new receiver appointed. On a motion to dismiss the
appeal, the order was said to be appealable, and Equity Rule 37 was held
not to prevent the intervener, once in the case, from challenging the present
eligibility of the receiver, even though the ineligibility charged existed at
the time of the appointment. The obvious implication from this remarkable
acrobatic is that if the attacker can succeed in intervening on a perfectly
harmless ground, he can then raise all the objections he cares to and will
be able to appeal from whatever orders are ordinarily appealable. The pos-
sibility is thus suggested of manipulating the "in subordination" requirement
into an extremely flexible and wellnigh meaningless phrase. But the weak-
nesses of the case as authority for this purpose are patent. The court ex-
pressly gave "scant consideration" to the motion to dismiss the appeal,
because it wanted to consider the merits of the case and, apparently, to
affirm the denial of the intervener's petition on substantive grounds. Mlore-
over, the intervener's objection was less to the propriety of the receivership
proceeding than to the particular receivers appointed. Similar attempts to
attack once intervention has been allowed, have been made elsewhere without
success, 27 notably where the interveners were not antagonistic to the receiver-
ship until the court refused to appoint their candidate for receiver.28 How-
24. Richfield Oil Co. v. Western Machinery Co., 279 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 9th,
1922), cert. denied, 260 U. S. 723 (1922).
25. See note 17, supra.
26. 74 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), cert. denied, sub non. Pollak v. McCulloch,
295 U. S. 746 (1935).
27. Mueller v. Adler, 292 Fed. 138 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923), cert. denied, 263 U. S.
721 (1924); Union Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Jones, 16 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 4th,
1926) ; Stallings v. Conn, 74 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934). But an objector, granted
leave to intervene, has been allowed to appeal from the appointment of the receiver
and other orders, the court making no comment as to his procedure. Robbins v. New-
berg, 85 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
28. Miller v. Pyrites Co., 71 F. (2d) 804 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934), eert. denied, 293
U. S. 604, 632 (1934).
[Vol. 47: 746750
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ever, it is not at all inconceivable that if a court were favorably impressed
with an intervener's claim, one of the techniques suggested by the above
two cases might effectively avoid the barrier of Rule 37. In the vast majority
of the recorded cases, the court has had no sympathy with the intervener's
purpose, especially where it has been apparent that he has stayed on the
sidelines until all chance to benefit by the receivership was gone.^
It is difficult to generalize as to the treatment of attacks through inter-
vention by the state courts. A few states follow the federal rule, either
under statutes resembling Rule 37,30 or by the use of the maxim that the
intervener "takes the case as he finds it,"31 or pursuant to the argument
that by intervening he recognizes the appointment of the receiver and can-
not later attack it on appeal.32 But the majority of states are liberal, not
only in permitting interveners to come in and attack the receivership as
collusive or unnecessary,m but also in allowing appeal from the denial of
such a privilege a4
A further possibility of attack in the receivership court itself is the inde-
pendent bill in equity seeking to vacate the receivership for collusion or
fraud, or to enjoin further proceedings. 35 Conceivably, an independent bill
showing both the impossibility of enforcing the claim by intervention or
otherwise and the danger of delay could be filed at any point in the proceed-
29. Pillinger v. Beaty, 265 Fed. 551 (C. C.A. 4th, 1920); American S. S. Co.
v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F. (2d) 886 (XV. D. N. Y. 1930); Stallings v.
Conn, 74 F. (2d) 189 (C. CA. 5th, 1934).
30. Livingston v. Southern Surety Co. of N. Y., 262 Mich. 438, 247 N. NV. 712
(1933).
31. Elliot v. Macauley, 177 Ga. 96, 169 S. E. 358 (1933).
32. Kreitzer v. Monarch Portland Cement Co., 92 Kan. 835, 141 Pac. 1004 (1914).
33. Western Acceptance Co. v. Simmons Co., 71 Colo. 127, 203 Pac. 1096 (1922);
Whilden v. Chapman, 80 S. C. 84, 61 S. E. 249 (1908); see First Nat. Bank of
Auburn v. Superior Court of Lassen County, 12 Cal. App. 335, 347, 107 Pac. 322,
327 (1909); Northampton Trust Co. v. Northampton Traction Co., 270 Pa. 199, 205,
112 At. 871, 873 (1921). However, the right to intervene and object may be lost by
delay. Jones-Dabney Co. v. Potter, 177 Ga. 620, 170 S. E. 788 (1933); Young v.
Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 258 Ky. 263, 79 S. ,V. (2d) 944 (1935).
34. Thayer v. Kinder, 45 Ind. App. 111, 89 N. F. 403 (1909), rdclaring deried,
45 Ind. App. 111, 90 N. E. 323 (1910); Lee v. Galena-Signal Oil Co. of Pa., 8 S. IV.
(2d) 1051 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Contra: Stirn v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp.,
163 Md. 398, 163 At. 696 (1933).
Where the intervener has been made a party defendant so as to raise objection to
the receiver's appointment, it is to be expected that the right to appeal from the denial
of his motions to vacate would be governed by the rules covering the same motions
when made by the original defendant. See e.g., Carrington v. Thomas C. Basshor
Co., 121 Md. 71, 75-6, 88 Ati. 52, 54 (1913).
35. Not uncommonly courts, in denying other means of relief, suggest that the
objector bring an independent action. See Whittaker v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 43 F.
(2d) 485, 491 (C.C. A. 8th, 1930); Elliot v. Macauley, 177 Ga. 96, 99, 169 S. E.
358, 360 (1933) ; Nevin v. Pacific Coast & Norway Packing Co., 105 Wash. 192, 197,
177 Pac. 739, 741 (1919).
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ings. The bill would then be comparable in function to the old English bills
in chancery. But the independent bill has been almost exclusively confined
to attacks on the entire proceeding after the final decree,8 and thus assumes
the nature of a bill of review. And since the bill of review cannot be used
to question an interlocutory order,"7 perhaps by dubious analogy any equit-
able bill brought before final judgment would also be disapproved. 8s No
hard rules can be laid down as to the substantive requirements necessary to
support the bill, largely because the matter has been so seldom adjudicated.
It has no doubt been felt by litigants and courts alike that where there are
grounds for a bill of this kind, the more practical and sensible solution is
to make the same plea in the original action, by intervening or merely
appearing for the purpose. Moreover, the scarcity of attacks of this sort may
be partly explained by the necessity for speed on the part of the objector.
Even though it be assumed that federal jurisdiction could be obtained and
other obstacles surmounted, the time involved in instituting a new suit and
prosecuting an appeal would in all likelihood allow the receivership to accom-
plish whatever damage was feared.39
The remaining possible methods of overthrowing the entire receivership
are those involving an attack in some other court. For instance, the con-
testing party may apply to a superior tribunal and seek to obtain a writ of
mandamus or prohibition against the receivership court. In the federal
courts and in most states, particularly in the east, the drastic nature of the
remedy apparently discourages its use. It is true that in the notorious
Metropolitan Railway case the petitioners applied to the Supreme Court for
writs of mandamus or prohibition, but the writs were denied and the remedy
neither approved nor disapproved.4 0 In a few states, notably California and
Missouri, prerogative writs are in common and effective use as attacks on
receiverships, and certain conclusions as to requisites may be drawn. In
the first place, the relator must have an interest in the proceedings below, 41
but he need not have been a party to the receivership 42 nor need he have
36. Darragh v. Wetter Mfg. Co., 78 Fed. 7 (C. C.A. 8th, 1897); Detroit Steel
Products Co. v. Heuer, 232 Mich. 55, 204 N. W. 691 (1925) ; Goodale Phonograph
Co. v. Valentine, 69 Wash. 263, 124 Pac. 691 (1912) ; cf. Boston & M. Rr. v. Delaware
& Hudson Co., 238 App. Div. 191, 264 N. Y. Supp. 470 (3d Dep't 1933) (successful
attack on appointment of receiver to a non-existent corporation).
37. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 521-522 (1934).
38. In the Plershem case counsel for one of the objecting bondholders himself
referred to his attack as "a bill in the nature of a bill of review." Clapier v. Flershem,
290 U. S. 504 (1934), Petitioner's Brief, p. 2.
39. See p. 763, infra.
40. Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90 (1908). The same treatment
was accorded the petitioner in Ex parte Relmar Holding Co., 61 F. (2d) 941 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932), cert. denied, 288 U. S. 614 (1933).
41. State ex reL. Hampe v. Ittner, 304 Mo. 135, 263 S. W. 158 (1924).
42. Ellis v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 138 Cal. App. 552, 33 P. (2d)
60 (1934) ("writ of certiorari," referred to as a "writ of review"); State cx rtl.
Priest v. Calhoun, 207 Mo. App. 149, 226 S.W. 329 (1920).
[Vol. 47: 746
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moved to vacate it43 nor have intervened for that purpose.44 But if he was
in a position to appeal and did not do so, he cannot obtain the more drastic
remedy45 unless he can show that an appeal would be inadequate.40  The
petitioner must further have maintained a consistently antagonistic attitude
towards the receivership.47 As to the grounds on which such an attack may
be based, it is generally assumed that they must be "jurisdictional." The
couift seem to be uniform in saying that the petitioner is not entitled to a
writ for error in the proceedings below,48 or for insufficiency of grounds
for the appointment 49 or failure to state a cause of action in the bill.
But nevertheless it is clear that something more than bare jurisdiction is
considered. Not only is the propriety of the receivership actually discussed
in almost every opinion denying a writ,5 ' but the writs are often issued for
what seems to be no more than serious error on the part of the lower court. 2'
The rule as stated in Missouri is characteristic: that prohibition will issue
where the judge has so abused discretion that his order must be treated as
"extra-jurisdictional," although the subject-matter ras within his juris-
diction.0
Closely analogous to the use of prerogative writs in that similar grounds
for relief must be shown, is the so-called collateral attack upon the receiver-
ship in another court of concurrent jurisdiction. This type of attack most
frequently arises in cases where a competing receivership has been set up
on the theory that the original proceeding was null and void.5 Collateral
43. Ibid.; cf. Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 327, 24 Pac. 121 (1890).
44. Ellis v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 138 Cal. App. 552, 33 P. (2d)
60 (1934) (writ of certiorari).
45. Sunset Farms v. Superior Court of Imperial County, 9 Cal. App. (2d) 389,
50 P. (2d) 106 (1935); Scholl v. Allen, 237 Ky. 716, 36 S.,V. (2d) 353 (1931);
Pontiac, Oxford, & Northern Rr. v. Oakland Circuit Judge, 142 Mich. 257, 105 N. AV.
745 (1905) ; State ex reL. Hampe v. Ittner, 304 Mo. 135, 263 S. V. 158 (1924). But
cf. Strother v. McCord, 222 Ala. 450, 132 So. 717 (1931) (prohibition issued without
necessity of appeal where court had usurped jurisdiction).
46. A. G. Col Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 196 Cal. 604, 238
Pac. 926 (1925); see Lieberman v. Superior Court of Orange County, 72 Cal. App.
18, 27, 236 Pac. 570, 573 (1925).
47. Scholl v. Allen, 237 Ky. 716, 36 S.V. (2d) 353 (1931); State ex re. Con-
nors v. Shelton, 238 Mo. 281, 142 S. W. 417 (1911).
48. See People ex reL Barrett v. Shurfleff, 353 Ill. 248, 259, 187 N. E. 271, 276
(1933).
49. See Strother v. McCord, 222 Ala. 450, 452, 132 So. 717, 718 (1931).
50. State ex rel. Leake v. Harris, 334 Mo. 713, 67 S. NV. (2d) 931 (1934).
51. E.g., Sunset Farms v. Superior Court of Imperial County, 9 Cal. App. (2d)
389, 50 P. (2d) 106 (1935); Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho 100, 72 Pac. 733 (1903).
52. Col Co. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 196 Cal. 604, 238 Pac. 926
(1925) ; State ex rel. Lund & Sager v. Mulloy, 330 Mo. 333, 49 S. NV. (2d) 1 (1932).
53. See State ex rel. Kopke v. Mulloy, 329 Mo. 1, 11, 43 S. NV. (2d) 806, 810
(1931).
54. Collateral attack upon receiverships has been attempted in other situations.
Although logically the same principles are applicable t9 all, it is invariably held that
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attacks are, however, rarely successfulF 5 The federal courts have been par-
ticularly strict in applying the conventional rule that only where the lack
of jurisdiction affirmatively appears on the face of the record can the receiver-
ship be disturbed. 0 It is consistently said to be immaterial whether or not
the order appointing the receiver was erroneous, inequitable, ill-advised, or
irregular.57 Although a majority of the state courts favor the strict rule as
laid down by the federal courts, s a few display more flexibility. Thus, even
though collateral attack is based upon the supposition that the proceedings
in another court are wholly null and void and hence in effect non-existent,69
several state courts, in not permitting the attack to succeed where the
objection was not made at the proper time or in the proper manner,s0 have
relied at least in part on substantive grounds. Such decisions indicate that
some courts consider collateral attack as but another method of upsetting
receiverships for sufficiently good reason, and not a mere ignoring of nullity.0 1
Thus, a few successful attacks were based on the insufficiency of the original
invalidity of a receiver's appointment is no defense to an action brought by him, as
on a bill or note. E.g., Miller v. Hockley, 80 F (2d) 980 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), ccrt.
denied, 298 U. S. 657 (1936). Collateral attack was, however, successful in defending
a contempt action. Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 291 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 3d,
1923). For circumstances of this case, see Riggs v. Burnrite Coal Briquette Co.,
295 Fed. 516, 517 (D. N. J. 1924).
55. An objecting creditor may, however, force the debtor into bankruptcy or move
for a 77B reorganization. Cf. In re Penny, 10 F. Supp. 638 (M. D. N. C. 1935);
In re Greyling Realty Corp., 74 F. (2d) 734 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 294 U. S.
725 (1935). See BANKRUPTCY AcT § 77B(i), 48 STAT. 920, 11 U.S. C. § 207(i) (1934).
Bankruptcy must be instituted within four months of the receivership. Neely v. McGehee,
2 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924). Although similar in effect to the typical collateral
attack, both of these methods entail a superseding of the receivership rather than an
upsetting of it, and the problems raised in any conflict between trustee and receiver
are not relevant here. Hence these alternatives will receive no further attention in
this Comment.
56. Pacific Coast Pipe Co. v. Conrad City Water Co., 245 Fed. 846 (C. C. A. 9th,
1917) (state court receivership under attack) ; Lydick v. Neville, 287 Fed. 479 (C. C. A.
8th, 1923).
57. See Grant v. Leach & Co., 280 U. S. 351, 359 (1930); Lively v. Picton, 218
Fed. 401, 406 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); Pacific Coast Pipe Co. v. Conrad City Water Co.,
245 Fed. 846, 849 (C. C.A. 9th, 1917).
58. Mitchell Mach. & Elec. Co. v. Sabin, 218 Ky. 289, 291 S.W. 381 (1927);
Detroit Trust Co. v. Lawrence, 235 Mich. 136, 209 N. W. 61 (1926); Greenfield
v. Hill City Land, Loan, and Lumber Co., 141 Minn. 393, 170 N. W. 343 (1919) ; Platt
v. New York & S. B. Ry. 170 N. Y. 451, 63 N.E. 532 (1902).
59. See VANFL , LAW OF CoLLATERAL ATrACK ON JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS (1892)
14.
60. Cooper v. Otero, 38 N. M. 164, 29 P. (2d) 341 (1934); Michigan State Indus-
tries v. Fischer Hardware Co., 50 Ohio App. 153, 197 N. E. 785 (1934).
61. This attitude may explain the similarity between the results of simple collateral
attack and of the more specialized form represented by the prerogative writ. See notes
48-52, mipra.
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creditor's bill, as where it did not allege insolvency, vrasting of assets, or
fraud on the part of the corporate officers.62 These allegations become
"jurisdictional facts," along with the existence of the corporation for which
the receiver was appointedG and the lack of an adequate remedy at law
for the original plaintiff.6 A further divergence from accepted concepts of
jurisdictional facts may possibly be found in those states where the court's
power to appoint a receiver is said not to be inherent, but strictly limited
and defined by statute,6 5 for in such states many questions may be deemed
"jurisdictional" that are elsewhere considered as affecting only the propriety
of the court's action.68 Similar differences arise as to the effectiveness of
consent on the part of the defendant debtor in waiving jurisdictional defectsp
Regardless of the rule in particular jurisdictions, however, neither the pre-
rogative writ nor collateral attack can ever be regarded as anything but
insecure remedies, no matter how meritorious the attacker's case.
From this examination of the various devices whereby a receivership may
be set aside in its entirety it is apparent that although the possibilities are
varied, the actual utility of these methods to the prospective attacker is of
negligible value. Whether the objector intervenes in the proceeding or brings
a bill of review or files a petition in some other court, he can never be sure
that even a meritorious claim will necessarily support his attack. Whichever
way he turns he is met with a procedural obstacle of one sort or another,
to say nothing of the practical difficulty of showing the lack of equity in
the proceeding.6 Under the existing law, dissentors are thus without a single
62. Blanchard Bro. & Lane v. Gay Co., 289 Ill. 413, 124 N. E. 616 (1919) ; State
ex rel. Nayberger v. McDonald, 128 Ore. 684, 274 Pac. 1104 (1929); see McKinney
v. Nayberger, 138 Ore. 203, 215, 2 P. (2d) 1111, 1114, 6 P. (2d) 228 (1931); cf.
State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435, 461, 25 S. NV. 947, 953 (1894); Texas
& P. Ry. v. Gay, 86 Tex. 571, 607, 26 S. W. 599, 614 (1894) scnble.
63. See Harned v. Beacon Hill Real Estate Co., 9 Del. Ch. 232, S0 Ati. 805 (Ch.
1911) semble.
64. See Michigan State Industries v. Fischer Hardware Co., 50 Ohio App. 153,
155, 197 N. E. 785, 786 (1934).
65. See People ex tel. Barrett v. Shurtleff, 353 Ill. 248, 260, 187 N. E. 271, 276
(1933); State ex tel. Merriam v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435, 461, 25 S. IV. 947, 953 (1894);
McKinney v. Nayberger, 138 Ore. 203, 219, 6 P. (2d) 228, 229 (1931).
66. Although the courts have not been articulate in maling this exception, the
results of the decided cases seem to support the statement in the text. Compare the
states represented in the cases cited in note 65 vth those in note 62, supra. See gener-
ally, State ex rel. Yohe v. District Court, 33 Vyo. 281, 296, 238 Pac. 545, 550 (1925);
1 Ft-taEn x, LAw OF JUDGMSENTS (5th ed. 1925) 735.
67. Compare First National Bank of Auburn v. Superior Court of Lassen County,
12 Cal. App. 335, 344, 107 Pac. 322, 326 (1909), with Re Metropolitan Ry. Receiver-
ship, 208 U. S. 90, 109 (1908).
Although it is arguable that collusive receiverships could be attacked collaterally,
especially in the federal courts, as lacking the elements of a "case ' or "controversy,"
this argument has not been made.
68. The procedural hazards interposed by the courts have commonly been justified
on the theory that they are necessary adjuncts to a yworkable reorganization process
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remedy which affords any substantial assurance that they can set a receiver-
ship aside even for cause shown.
The unhappy position of such dissenting groups 9 has given rise to con-
siderable agitation to liberalize the intervention provisions, 70 for the "in
subordination" requirement of Rule 37 has hitherto been an almost impassable
obstacle facing the attacker of an equity proceeding. One of the first indi-
cations that this agitation has not been in vain may be found in the pro-
vision of the Bankruptcy Act relating to attack upon reorganizations under
Section 77B. 71 Subsection (a) provides in effect that specified classes of
creditors and stockholders shall have an absolute right to appear and con-
trovert the allegations made in the petition together with any jurisdictional
facts necessary to the maintenance of the proceeding.72 The express purpose
of the provision is to permit a questioning of the existing necessity and
good faith of the proposed reorganization. It seems, however, that the ap-
pearance authorized under this section must be within thirty days of the
original petition.73 And since the problems encountered by a 77B court
are substantially identical with those raised by a receivership, Subsection
(a) is highly illustrative of current notions respecting minority rights,
More pertinent to the issue at hand, however, is the proposed revision
of Rule 37, which goes even further in the direction of encouraging promiscu-
ous attack. Rule 24 of the new Federal Rules, 74 now before Congress,
-an argument which the courts frequently employ to bar "outsider" interference.
Compare the "rule of convenience to facilitate the conduct of the suit," "an exception
to the general principle that all interested should join in the controversy." See note
115, in!ra.
69. The hardship might be minimized if a technique employed and recommended by
District Judge Woolsey of New York should become a general practice. On application
for the appointment of a receiver, he appointed a temporary one to examine the financial
condition of the defendant corporation, and, having received the latter's report, he then
dismissed the action. Municipal Financial Corp. v. Bankus Corp., 45 F. (2d) 902
(S. D. N. Y. 1930). It is to be regretted that this eminently sensible lead has not
been followed.
70. Cf. Moore and Levi, note 17, sup ra.
71. 48 STAT. 912, 11 U.S. C. § 207 (1934). Section 77, as amended, likewise
provides an easy method for creditors to protest the proceeding at the outset. 49
STAT. 912 (1935), 11 U. S. C. §205(a) (Supp. 1937).
72. The only persons who can maintain an attack under this section are "
three or more creditors who have provable claims which amount in the aggregate
in excess of the value of securities held by them, if any, to $1,000 or over:' and,
. . . stockholders holding 5 per centum in number of all shares of stock of any
class of the debtor outstanding . . . " Section 77B(c), however, provides that any
stockholder or creditor may intervene for the purpose of attacking particular orders
handed down by the reorganization court. See note 121, infra.
73. An appearance under 77B (a) must be made " . . . prior to the hearing
provided for in subdivision (c), clause (1) . . . " Under the latter provision a
hearing is required within thirty days of the approval of the petition.
74. Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States. See
(1938) U. S. L. W m.z, No. 18, See. 2 (Supp.),8-9.
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provides that intervention shall be of right70 " . . (1) when a statute
of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2)
when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or
may be inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment
in the action; or (3) when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court . . . " Within these limits the right to intervene and attack
the proceeding immediately upon intervention is apparently absolute; no
mention is made of the "in subordination" requirement of Rule 37.
Preliminary to any analysis of Rule 24, it is important to distinguish
between intervention for the purpose of attacking particular orders handed
down by the receivership court and intervention for the purpose of knocking
out the proceeding as a whole. To the extent that this provision assures
dissenters the right to be heard on questions arising within the scope of a
reorganization, 77 no criticism 7" can be made of the liberality"0 of the new
Rule. But Section 77B(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and Section 24 of the
New Federal Rules do not limit intervention to those situations where an
objector wishes to attack a particular order made by a reorganization court.
As pointed out above, they permit an attack upon the entire proceeding on
jurisdictional grounds, and in this respect the advisability of relaxing equity
restrictions is open to serious doubt. Although it may be true that Equity
Rule 37 occasions harsh results in those cases where a receivership is
fraudulently conceived, the practical consequences of invalidating the pro-
ceeding preclude the possibility of any abstract disposition of the problem
based upon philosophical analysis of creditor's rights. In the first place,
attacks upon receiverships are not always prompted by a bona fide desire
to set the proceeding aside. To the extent that these contests represent a
genuine threat to the reorganization, their nuisance value is patent. Hoping
to be bought off at an advantageous price, dissenters may press suits where
there is no possibility of other material gain.80 The greater the ease with
75. Under the Act of June, 1934, authorizing rules uniting law and equity, the
new rules apparently will take effect at the close of the present session, if Congress
takes no further action. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S. C. § 723 (c) (1934) ; see Clark, Pou er
of the Sspreme Court to Make Rules of Appellate Procedure (1936) 49 Hnv. I. R-.v
1303, 1309.
76. Rule 24 also provides for intervention under other circumstances at the dis-
cretion of the court.
77. Existing possibilities for intervention to object to specific orders vithin the
receivership are discussed at pp. 762-766, infra.
78. In this respect, Rule 24 represents a substantial improvement over the existing
law relating to intervention. See p. 765, infra.
79. There seems to be no reason why any creditor or stockholder may not qualify
under Subsection (3) of the new rule, as one "so situated as to be adversely affected"
by the result.
80. For motives and tactics of "strikers," see SEcunrmss A D Excxcn Courns-
STON, REPORT ON PROTECrIVE AND REORGANIZATION COM.nm.rnMS (1936-1937), Part 1,
691-733, 878-883.
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which they can tie up proceedings, the greater will be the nuisance value
of these suits, and consequently the greater the temptation to creditors in
general to adopt the same tactics -thus threatening any sort of efficient
administration of receiverships. Nor will judicial condemnation of nuisance
suits and refusal to grant stays alone suffice to remedy the evils of un-
restrained attack, for even when the receivership is shown to be fraudulent
and is consequently set aside, the position of the contestants, the assentors
and the corporation alike is not materially improved. The immediate effect
is usually a free-for-all race of diligence, no one creditor being in any better
position than another.8 ' Since the fact of receivership will usually result
in insolvency even if that condition was not originally present,82 the chance
of full realization on claims is at best dubious. With all opportunity gone
for the debtor to work through to a fresh start, liquidation becomes inevit-
able, and not only are the claims of majority creditors jeopardized but
employees and others dependent on the existence of the corporation are
deprived of their opportunity for livelihood.8 3
It is conceivable that the more unfortunate effects of a successful attack
upon a receivership could be alleviated to some extent by imposing a time
limitation on the period during which such an attack could be brought. For
instance, Rule 24 might be amended 4 to conform with the requirement of
Section 77B(a), that any attack based on jurisdictional grounds must be
commenced within thirty days of the filing of the petition. Such an amend-
ment would be particularly opportune in those cases where the objection
made to the receivership is that the corporation was at all times ready and
willing to meet its debts as they matured, for, if the fraudulent character of
the proceeding is immediately exposed, an originally solvent corporation
might conceivably survive the customary aftermath of a successful attack.
And even where solvency is not in issue there can be no question as to the
desirability of limiting jurisdictional attack to the early stages of the receiver-
ship, i.e., before assenting groups have acted in reliance on its validity. The
customary creditors' race might be avoided by a blanket injunction pro-
81. The race of diligence may be avoided if the corporation goes into voluntary
bankruptcy or under Section 77B. Cf. note 55, supra.
82. It is noteworthy that even in the Flershem case, where the appointment of
the receiver was held to have been collusive, largely because insolvency was not then
imminent, the corporation actually became insolvent before the entry of the order of
sale. 290 U. S. 504, 517, 519 (1934).
83. The unhappy results flowing from the overthrow of a debtor relief proceeding
have long been judicially recognized. See Pinneo v. Hart, 30 Mo. 561, 569 (1860);
cf. Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 112 (1908).
84. For Congress to change the rules, it will apparently be necessary to enact
legislation "of like dignity" to the Act of 1934. See Clark, Ioc. cit. supra, note 75.
However, under the Act the Supreme Court's power to issue rules is made continuing,
so that presumably they could be amended at any time. 48 STAT. 1064, 28 U. S, C.
§ 723(b) (1934).
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hibiting creditors from levying execution upon the property of the debtor
immediately following the dissolution of the proceeding.
Advocation of the "in subordination" requirement does not imply that
dissenters should be deprived of all remedy against a receivership fraudu-
lently procured. Actually, several other methods exist whereby the objector
may obtain full satisfaction for whatever loss he has suffered as a result
of the receivership without at the same time disrupting the entire proceed-
ing. A possible solution to this end is an attack which does not purport to
overthrow the receivership as a whole but only to avoid its effect upon
the parties contesting it.85 Such an attack is well typified by the "special
appearance" method, so-called for want of a better term. Procedurally this
type of attack cannot be classified. It seems to involve merely an appearance
before the court, an argument made, and either a motion to be appealed
from, or simply an appeal taken from an order of the court in the main
proceeding. This procedure was early foreshadowed in the Metropolitan
Railway case.8 G In that case, the objecting claimants merely made "applica-
tion" to the trial court praying the dismissal of the original bill in equity
for fraud, etc. Their petition was later amended to include a prayer to be
allowed to intervene in behalf of other creditors, and was then in all respects
denied; but at least it was heard, and appears to have put the objectors in
a position, if not to appeal, at least to lay the foundation for their original
applications to the Supreme Court.
Twenty-five years later in another landmark case in receivership law, First
National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershtenm7 almost the same thing vras done,
this time with eminent success. Two of the non-assenting debenture holders
"appeared specially" at the hearing oh the confirmation of the sale ten months
after the receiver's appointment and objected to the whole proceeding. From
the decree affirming the sale they appealed, apparently without protest, and
reached the Supreme Court by certiorari. It is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that the objectors were lucky. In the first place, it is at best doubtful
if their procedure could have withstood objection, particularly at the point
of initial appearance. Secondly, it seems clear that if the Supreme Court
had not felt strongly on the subject of the collusive receivership, it would
have found fatal fault with the objectors for waiting so long, presumably "to
see which way the cat would jump," before attacking the original bill as
to jurisdiction and general equity. Nevertheless, the significance of the case
85. This result has been sought, and in one case, at least, has apparently been
reached by means of collateral attack. Texas & P. Ry. v. Gay, 86 Tem. 571, 26 S. IV.
599 (1894) (death action against railroad in receivership where law prohibited such
actions against receivers). Cf. cases cited in notes 58 and 63, mipra. The probability
is, however, that a receivership once declared a nullity in any proceeding would not
long survive.
86. Re Metropolitan Ry. Receivership, 208 U. S. 90, 97-98 (1908).
87. 290 U. S. 504, 515 (1934).
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procedurally can easily be underestimated, since the method of attack fol-
lowed is not wholly unknown in some Circuit Courts of Appeals.88
Closely related to the "special appearance" method is the procedure fol-
lowed in Shapiro v. Wilgues. 9 There, after the appointment of a receiver,
and the injunction against attachments and executions (but not suits) unless
permitted by the court, the objecting creditor filed suit and recovered a
judgment in a state court. He thereupon "made application in due form"
before the district court for permission to levy execution on the debtor's
property in the hands of the receivers. Upon appeal from denial and certi-
orari, he was declared to be entitled to payment in full by the receivers or
leave to issue execution. The court appeared to limit the availability of the
method to cases where there was no "substantial doubt that the conveyance
and the receivership were voidable obstructions," speaking almost entirely
in fraudulent conveyance terms, and once again the question was undecided
as to whether the hearing of the application and the appeal from its denial
were of rightY0 Notwithstanding these uncertainties, where the original
decree takes a similar form,91 the procedure is less amorphous and enjoys
greater formality than the special appearance method, and it brings the same
reward if successful. It is noteworthy that a similar procedure has been
employed with comparative frequency by receivers seeking to obtain pos-
session from a competing receiver in another court.92 But since a court
officer is no doubt entitled to greater attention and respect in an informal
proceeding than the typical objecting creditor, this practice can afford only
a dubious precedent for the methods outlined above. Possibly because the
88. Kingsport Press v. Brief English Systems, 54 F. (2d) 497 (C. C.A. 2d, 1931),
cert. denied, 286 U. S. 545 (1932) ; Seneca Sec. Corp. v. Medinah Athletic Club, 74 F. (2d)
108 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; cf. New York Trust Co. v. Watts-Ritter & Co., 57 F. (2d)
1012 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932) (mortgage trustee filed special appearance to contest court's
jurisdiction over it and to obtain leave to foreclose mortgage in a separate suit). These
attacks were all unsuccessful, but the procedure was tolerated.
The possibility of filing briefs as ainici curtie on appeal from any order of thq
receivership court and arguing for dismissal of the original bill has been recognized.
People's-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Hirsch, 65 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
89. 287 U. S. 348, 351-352 (1932).
90. Other precedent is equally unsatisfactory in that the attacks failed on sub-
stantive grounds and no procedural questions were raised. Ketchum v. McDonald
85 F. (2d), 436 (C. C. A. 3d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 595 (1936); Patterson v.
Patterson, 184 Fed. 547 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1910); First National Bank of Medford,
Ore. v. Stewart Fruit Co., 17 F. (2d) 621 (N. D. Cal. 1927). In the last case cited,
the creditor ordered the sheriff to levy execution, and appeared in the receivership
court to make his attack when that court issued a restraining order against the sheriff.
91. Even an injunction against the bringing of any action might not prove fatal to
the use of this method if an appeararqce were first made to attack the injunction. Seneca
Sec. Corp. v. Medinah Athletic Club, 74 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
92. Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 168 (1895); Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U. S. 36
(1928) ; Lee v. Edmunds, 66 F. (2d) 122 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933) ; cf. Mitchell v. Maurer,
293 U. S. 237 (1934) (insurance commissioner).
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state courts are not as strict in their limitations on attack through interven-
tion, these methods have not been favored outside of the federal courts,0 3
although a variety of attempts to use them have been made.04 It is true
that there have been a few instances when attorneys have simply informed
the judge of circumstances making his appointment of a receiver wholly
improvident and that he has vacated the order of appointment on his own
behalf, 5 but in these cases personal factors rather than procedural problems
were involved.
Although the "special appearance" and the method of attack suggested in
Shapiro v. Wilgus are both remedies of doubtful certainty, there can be no
doubt as to their value to the objecting creditor in those cases where they
prove successful. By making a special appearance, the creditor may obtain
a judicial declaration that the receivership proceedings are entirely void as
to him.9 6 He may then levy execution and collect 100%o of his claim. The
same result may be reached when the creditor obtains leave to levy execu-
tion as was done in the Shapiro case. There is no necessity for a race of
diligence, for in neither of these cases is the receivership vacated as to all
concerned. An attempt by other creditors to ride the coattails of the venture-
some attacker and reap the same benefits was made in proceedings fol-
lowing the Flershem case, but without success.07 Even from the point of
view of the corporation as a whole, it is arguable that the "special appearance"
is preferable to a more general attack through intervention. Although ob-
jectors may become entitled to payment in full, satisfaction of their claims
will permit the receivership to continue an uninterrupted course which may
lead to eventual rehabilitation of the company.
But despite the advantages which may follow from the "special appear-
ance" method of attack, there are countervailing objections which render
its extensive use as undesirable as a general overthrow of the proceeding.
First, the attacding creditor must be paid the entire amount of his claim
even though total available assets may be far from sufficient to meet all
obligations of the debtor corporation. Such a preference can hardly be
93. Cambridge Savings Bank v. Clerk of Courts for Hampden County, 243 Mass.
424, 137 N. E. 872 (1923); Holliday v. Hemingway, 137 S. C. 124, 134 S. E. 530
(1926). -For implications of greater liberality, cf. Haines v. Commercial Mortgage
Co., 206 Cal. 10, 273 Pac. 35 (1928); In re Geo. D. Geddes Undertaking & Emb:lming
Co., 177 So. 240 (La. 1937); Eureka Specialty Co. v. Settelmeyer, 22 Ohio App. 197,
153 N. . 226 (1926).
94. State vx rel. Crawford v. Almeda Consol. Mfines Co., 107 Ore. 18, 212 Pac.
789 (1923); Nevin v. Pacific Coast & Norvay Packing Co., 105 Wash. 192, 177 Pac.
739 (1919); see First National Bank of Auburn v. Superior Court of Lassen County,
12 Cal. App. 335, 340, 107 Pac. 322, 324-325 (1909). These attacks all failed without
the precise procedural issue being raised.
95. Frick v. Calmin Mortgage Corp., 220 Cal. 746, 32 P. (2d) 619 (1934) ; Brandi-
more v. Dickens, 256 Mich. 128, 239 N. NV. 346 (1931).
96. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. 5. 304, 520 (1934).
97. First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Waters, 82 F. (2d) 339 (C. C A. 3d, 1936).
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justified in terms of the equitable policy of pro rata administration of debtor's
estates.98 Its effect upon participating small creditors seems particularly
unfair, since full satisfaction of the attacker's claims will proportionately
diminish the amount of assets to be distributed among those who have relied
in good faith upon the validity of the proceeding. But even though it be
assumed that the preference accorded to those who are successful in their
attack is warranted as against assenting creditors, recurring judicial declar-
ations upholding this method of attack would place so high a premium on
dissent that the essential work of securing creditor's cooperation and assent
to a reorganization would become virtually impossible.
Whatever objections may be raised to attacks upon the validity of a re-
ceivership either as a whole or in part, none of these defects needs apply to
the second general course of action open to the dissenter, that of attacking
particular orders within the scope of the proceeding. Certainly the effect
of a successful attack upon a single order is in no way as disastrous as an
overthrow of the entire proceeding. Instead of a race of diligence and prob-
able liquidation of the debtor corporation, the reviewing court can merely
direct an amendment of the erroneous order, or, if the case requires, insist
upon a re-evaluation of the property and adjustment of the upset price.
Nor is there any unjustifiable preference in favor of the contesting party
since all the creditors will benefit by a successful attack.
When the dissenter phrases his attack in terms of a particular order
handed down by the receivership court, the procedural path is comparatively
clear. Whether the creditor or stockholder wishes to attack the particular
receiver appointed"9 or the judge presiding,100 the fairness of the reorgan-
ization plan,101 or the adequacy of the upset price,10 2 in the vast majority
of cases he will seek to intervene for the purpose. True, it has been sug-
gested on occasion that a creditor who is dissatisfied with the activities
of his representative in the receivership should bring an independent suit,10 3
but such suits, although they have been attempted, 0 4 have not been en-
couraged, apparently on the ground that the plea might more properly have
been made in the original proceeding.' 0 5 Moreover, objectors have some-
98. See Reed v. McIntyre, 98 U. S. 507, 512 (1878).
99. E.g., Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle West Utilities Co., 74 F. (2d) 779
(C.C.A. 7th, 1935).
100. Cf. Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U. S. 479 (1933).
101. E.g., Conley v. International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 286 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
102. E.g., First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504, 522 et seq.
(1934).
103. See Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y. v. 10 East 40th St. Corp., 238 App.
Div. 370, 378, 264 N. Y. Supp. 882, 892 (1st Dep't 1933) (dissenting opinion).
104. Bergelt v. Roberts, 144 Misc. 832, 258 N. Y. Supp. 905 (Sup. Ct. 1932),
aff'd, 236 App. Div. 794, 258 N. Y. Supp. 1086 (1st Dep't 1932); Rice v. Pounds,
153 Misc. 226, 274 N. Y. Supp. 637 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
105. See Rice v. Pounds, 153 Misc. 226, 227, 274 N. Y. Supp. 637, 638 (Sup. Ct.
1934) semnble.
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times appeared in receivership proceedings without having previously inter-
vened,106 but it may be surmised that in most of these cases the dissenters
were served with notice of the hearing and were fully expected to come in
and make their objections. 07 In spite of these more or less isolated cases
intervention in subordination is the standard method of attack, especially
when there is opposition to the protest.
Although intervention is admittedly the most desirable of these procedures,
the intervening party is presented with a difficult problem in determining
when he should make his attack. Where the objection is raised at the hearing
preliminary to the final confirmation of the sale, the objector will almost
always be permitted to intervene and to appeal from that decree.'0 s And
even though the attack is not made until after the final decree, the Boyd
case' 0 9 indicates that, if the creditor is not guilty of laches,"l0 there is
virtually no limit upon the assertion of his rights. There are, however,
certain practical disadvantages in delaying the attack until this time, or even
until the approval of the plan. Among these must be included the inertia
of the courts in overturning what has already been accomplished. The con-
summation of the sale and probable unwillingness of court and parties alike
to repeat the whole weary process are factors difficult to evaluate but which
must nevertheless be taken into consideration by any objector who hopes
to maintain a successful attack. Moreover, the damage to the creditor may
have taken place at or shortly after the time of original appointment, and
in such cases it may be ruinous to wait until the receivership court has
finally approved a plan. For instance, the objecting creditor may wish to
contest the particular receiver directly after his appointment, or the reor-
ganization plan"' and upset price immediately upon their promulgation.
106. Investment Registry Ltd. v. Chicago & 11. E. Rr., 212 Fed. 594 (C. C.A.
7th, 1913) ; First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Bryn Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp., 365 IlL 409,
6 N. E. (2d) 654 (1937).
107. See, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Bryn Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp., 355
Ill. 409, 413, 6 N. E. (2d) 654, 657 (1937).
108. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry., 174 U. S. 674 (1899);
First Nat Bank of Cincinnati v. Fleshem, 290 U. S. 504, 522 (1934); Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. International Combustion Engineering Corp., 66 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A.
2d, 1933); see generally, Moore and Levi, Lipra note 17. But cf. Palmer v. Bankers'
Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (bondholder held to be adequately
represented by trustee); Conley v. International Pump Co., 237 Fed. 226 (S. D.
N. Y. 1915) semble (stockholders represented by receiver).
109. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482 (1913). The creditor brought
an independent action ten years after the sale. Cf. Kansas City Southern Ry. v.
Guardian Trust Co., 240 U. S. 166 (1916) (objection made in original action three
years after sale).
110. Beaton v. Seaboard Portland Cement Co., 211 Fed. 84 (C. C.A. 2d, 1914); see
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 508-9 (1913).
111. It seems clear that a court may take jurisdiction over and approve a proposed
plan of reorganization before the sale [Eastern States Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Atlantic
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In such cases, the logical move would seem to be to intervene and appeal
from the order objected to. Although a few federal courts have been lenient
in this respect, 1 2 the majority rule appears to be that intervention for this
purpose is not of right 1 3 and hence not appealable."14 Various explanations
have been advanced to support this rule, among them being the argument
that the objector is already adequately represented." 5 This contention, how-
ever, seems patently fallacious, the very fact of intervention militating against
its truth. Certainly no creditor will intervene unless he feels that his inter-
ests are in conflict with the majority group. It is further said that inter-
vention at such a time is premature, that it will be time enough for objec-
tions to be heard before confirmation of the sale. 110 But the creditor may
believe, and with reason, that it will then be too late.117
The almost universal refusal to permit intervention during the early
stages of a receivership is merely another indication of current judicial con-
cessions to the controlling majority elements of large scale reorganizations. 118
Public Util., 17 Del. Ch. 338, 156 Atl. 214 (Ch. 1931) ; see Habirshaw Electric Cable
Co. v. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co., Inc., 296 Fed. 875, 879 (C.C.A. 2d, 1924)], as
well as after the sale. First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Bryn Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp.,
365 Ill. 409, 6 N. E. (2d) 654 (1937).
112. Lincoln Printing Co. v. Middle West Utilities Co., 74 F. (2d) 779 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935); Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 238 Fed. 812 (E. D.
Mo. 1916); cf. Habirshaw Electric Cable Co. v. Habirshav Electric Cable Co., Inc.,
296 Fed. 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1924). New York courts have been consistently favorable.
De Betz's Petition, 9 Abb. N. C. 246 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1878) semble; Clinton Trust
Co. v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp., 237 App. Div. 789, 263 N. Y. Supp. 359 (2di
Dep't 1933); Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y. v. 10 East 40th St. Corp., 238 App.
Div. 370, 264 N. Y. Supp. 882 (1st Dep't 1933).
113. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 15 F. (2d) 434
(N. D. Ill., 1926), leave to file writ of mandamus denied, sub norn. Ex Parte in the
Matter of Jameson, 273 U. S. 650 (1927), approved, sub nom. Jameson v. Guaranty
Trust Co. of N. Y., 20 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927); Continental & Commercial
Trust & Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 200 Fed. 600 (E. D. Wis. 1912). But
cf. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 238 Fed. 812 (E. D. Mo. 1916)
(motion to strike intervening petition denied).
114. Palmer v. Bankers' Trust Co., 12 F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Guaranty
Trust Co. of N. Y. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 15 F. (2d) 443 (N. D. Ill. 1926).
But see Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 61 F. (2d) 934, 939-940 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), aff'd,
289 U. S. 479, 496 (1933).
115. See Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,
200 Fed. 600, 606-7 (E. D. Wis. 1912) (a "rule of convenience"); Guaranty Trust
Co. of N. Y. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 15 F. (2d) 434, 440 (N. D. Ill., 1926).
116. See Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 20 F. (2d) 808, 815; (C. C. A.
7th, 1927); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 79 F.
(2d) 804, 807-8 (C. C.A. 8th, 1935).
117. See Moore & Levi, supra note 17, at 599.
118. Mr. Robert T. Swaine believes it "to be established by the decisions
that the determination of the fairness of a plan should properly be had upon the
application for confirmation of a sale . . . " Swaine, Reorganizatlion of Corporations;
1938] METHODS OF ATTACKING RECEIVERSHIPS
It has no doubt been felt that efficient conduct of receiverships would be
considerably disturbed by constant interventions and appeals. But if carried
to its logical extreme this argument becomes patently absurd. Concededly,
the smoothest and least troublesome method of effectuating a reorganization
would be to permit the management group to dictate the plan and conduct
the entire proceeding. The mere statement of the proposition, however,
does violence to accepted concepts underlying the administration of a cor-
porate debtor's estates. The essence of reorganization procedure to date
has been a bargaining process 1 9 which presupposes that all classes of stock-
holders and creditors are either present or represented in the proceeding
and can hence partake in the negotiations antecedent to the drafting of a
plan. To provide all opposing interests with a fair opportunity to exercise
whatever bargaining power each may possess, it seems that easy intervention
at the outset of the proceeding is a prerequisite. 2 0 Nor is there any practical
justification for the existing rule. By permitting stays only under high bond
and by punishing frivolous appeals the nuisance value of these suits can be
effectively curtailed.
Although it is too early to prophesy with any assurance of accuracy, it
seems that the adoption of the new Federal Rules will obviate the necessity
of delaying intervention in receiverships until the reorganization plan has
become to all intents and purposes a fait accompli. Although the wisdom
of the abolition of the "in subordination" clause of Equity Rule 37 may
be questioned, Rule 24 represents a substantial improvement over current
equity practice in two respects. It clarifies the rights of dissenters by setting
out definite standards as to who may intervene and it places no limit on
the time within which such intervention must take place. Of course it is
possible that if and when these Rules go into effect, reactionary interpre-
tation by the courts may strip such provisions of their clearly intended
liberality. For instance, the provision of subdivision (3) that intervention
shall be of right "when the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of the property in the custody of the
court" might be interpreted to mean that the dissenter would have no right
to intervene until he had been actually "affected," as, e.g., by a sale of the
property. But this interpretation would clearly violate the obvious purpose
of the Rules.' 2 '
Certain Developments of the Last Decade in So!n LEGAL. PrASEs or Corraaxr
FINANCING, REoRGANiZATION AND REGuLATIo 1926-1930 (1931) 133, 146.
119. Cf. Comment (1937) 47 YA=x L. J. 247.
120. See Katz, The Protection of Minority Bondholders i; Foreclosures and Receiver-
ships (1936) 3 U. oF CHL L REv. 517, 531.
121. If interpreted so as to carry out this purpose, Rule 24 should provide more
adequate protection to the intervener even than that afforded in 77B reorganization.
Section 77B(c) provides that only objections to the permanent appointment of the
trustee or the confirmation of the plan may be made as of right, and offers no opportunity
for policing the formulation of the plan.
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